The author, a tutor in philosophy at the University of Melbourne, attempts to take a fresh look at the traditional problem of theodicy: is the existence of an omnipotent and good God compatible with the presence of evil in the world? Focusing his attention primarily on the writings of English-speaking theists and their critics in the analytic tradition, he argues that "the main arguments of both theist and nontheist fail and that evil leaves God's existence an open question." The study (...) begins with the interesting and basic argument that there are, in fact, "three distinct kinds of problems about the logical compatibility of God and evil": the general, abstract question whether the existence of even one instance of any kind of evil logically excludes the existence of a good and omnipotent God; the specific abstract questions whether the existence of God is compatible with specific sorts, degrees, or numerical instances of evil; the specific concrete questions whether, granted possible conditions for the compatibility of theistic belief with evil in the world, these conditions are met in our world. In what is the most thorough section of the book, he argues regarding the general question that: "It cannot be shown that, if any evil exists, a wholly good, omnipotent being could not exist." "It seems possible to show that a wholly good, omnipotent being could exist, if some evil exists." Then he makes similar, but rather summary, claims regarding the specific abstract problems. Finally, regarding the specific concrete problems, he examines four theistic attempts to deal with them and concludes that all such attempts cannot be very successful. One might wish that the basic terms of the discussion--omnipotence, perfect goodness, and evil--had been more fully examined and that the abstract, logical questions with which the author deals had been related more directly to the lived experience of the theist and the atheist. However, within the limits he sets to his consideration, the author's work, especially his mapping of the problem, is careful and illuminating.--H. F. (shrink)

This anthology contains ten selections on the philosophy of religion, all of which were written by English-speaking analytic philosophers. The opening selection contains the contributions of Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell to the University discussion on theology and falsification. This first selection, written in 1951, establishes the basic problematic for the book, as indeed it has for much of the discussion of religion among analytic philosophers during the last twenty years. The next three chapters in the book (...) contain articles by I. M. Crombie, John Hick, and R. B. Braithwaite which further develop the question of the falsifiability of religious statements. These are followed by articles by J. L. Mackie and Alvin Plantinga which give contrary interpretations regarding the impact of the existence of evil upon the credibility of religious assertions. The remaining chapters contain discussions of religious belief by D. Z. Phillips and H. H. Price, and of the possibility of deciding the question of the existence of God by R. W. Hepburn and Terence Penelhum. The editor provides a helpful introduction which shows the relationships between the various articles and underscores the main contributions of each. The editor also provides a useful and ample bibliography of English-language books and articles on the philosophy of religion, most of them by analytic philosophers. The bibliography is arranged according to the subject-matter covered in the text. This is a representative and useful anthology of the analytic philosophy of religion. It makes clear what are the major questions which interest analytic philosophers of religion, what procedures these thinkers use to try to answer these questions, and what some of their answers are. The editor suggests that if there is a single lesson to be learned from his anthology, it is that the philosophy of religion demands both philosophical competence and a sympathetic understanding of the religious subject-matter. Another lesson one could easily draw from this collection is that the strength of analytic philosophy of religion lies in its logical exactitude and clarity of expression, while a major weakness is its neglect of the wealth of data regarding religion provided by phenomenology, the history of religions, and the social sciences.--H. F. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that "wonder is the foundation of the whole of philosophy.... It is not only the beginning but also the end; it guides and accompanies thought. It is not only the first but also the last word." This is because "wonder is man’s attitude in the face of the mystery of things." That is, "in wonder, things are no longer what they were and it can thus be said that they lose their identity.... Only when (...) we decide to think no further do things acquire an apparent identity." Thought and wonder live only in the distance between the trivial identity of things and their infinitely deferred divine identity. Wonder, and therefore philosophy, are threatened on many sides: by a complacency which takes things as simply thus and so, by general education which equips one to converse about many things but gives knowledge of nothing, by haste which rushes by things without noticing them, by systematization and certitude impatient with identity deferred. The study of philosophy as an academic discipline is no guarantee of wonder and can even be its enemy. The author’s intent is to excite wonder, to provide an incitement to philosophy. The ten chapters of the book orchestrate his theme from different starting points and by different paths. The starting points are as different as the symbolism of the noonday sun, Plato’s myths, poetic response to a rose in bloom, and the nature of gift and festivity. The paths are lyrical, etymological, phenomenological. The cumulative effects are not so much clear and distinct ideas as paradoxes. The result is a provocative and often obscure book, which makes considerable demands upon the reader. As such, it hardly seems like the sort of book one would hand to an undergraduate who wanted to know what philosophy is about. Rather, it might better be thought of as a book for people who think they know what philosophy is about, a book which could serve to make one wonder if he does know what philosophy and many other things are and are not.—H. F. (shrink)